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AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY HELD TO COVER
STOLEN CAR
Sperling v. Great American Indemnity Company
7 N.Y.2d 442, 199 N.Y.S.2d 465, 166 N.E.2d 482 (1960)
This action was brought by plaintiff judgment creditor to compel the
insurer, under a family automobile policy, to pay a judgment obtained by
plaintiff against the insured's 16 year old daughter, who, while driving an
automobile she had stolen, collided with another vehicle, causing the death
of plaintiff's testate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment below
holding that since the express terms of the policy regarding nonowned
vehicles did not require permission by the owner, the stolen car driven by
the daughter of the insured was within the terms of the policy.
The relevant portions of the insurance policy provided: "Persons in-
sured: (a) With respect to the owned automobile, (1) the named insured
and any resident of the same household, (2) any other person using such
automobile, provided the actual use thereof is with the permission of the
named insured; (b) With respect to a nonowned automobile, (1) the named
insured, (2) any relative, but only with respect to a private passenger
automobile or trailer not regularly furnished for the use of such relative."1
The problem presented is whether or not it was the intent of the parties,
as expressed in the contract of insurance, for the policy coverage to extend
to relatives driving stolen cars. It was argued by the dissent that the words,
"not regularly furnished," implied a positive requirement that the car be
furnished, i.e., loaned with permission, and thus the policy was not intended
to include a stolen car which was not furnished at all.2 The purpose of the
"regular use" clause was to withdraw from coverage cars not owned by the
insured which were used often or regularly by the insured or his family.3 The
1 Sperling v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 442, 446, 199 N.Y.S.2d 465, 468,
166 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1960). The term "relative" was defined in the policy as meaning
"a relative who is a resident of the same household," and the term "nonowned auto-
mobile," was defined as meaning "an automobile or trailer not owned by the named
insured or any relative, other than a temporary substitute automobile." Supra at 446,
199 N.Y.S.2d at 468, 166 N.E.2d at 484.
2 This was in fact one of the main points in the dissenting opinion written by
Judge Foster. "The phrase most opposite to the phrase 'not regularly furnished,' and
the one that would commonly come to mind, is 'occasionally furnished.' To adopt such
a construction is not writing anything in the policy. It is simply adopting the most
natural implication that arises from the key word 'furnished,' and carries with it the
idea of use with permission, express or implied. A stolen car is never 'furnished' and
of course not operated with permission, express or implied." Id. at 453, 199 N.Y.S.2d
at 474, 166 N.E.2d at 488.
3 See Campbell v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 211 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1954); Miller
v. Farmers' Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 179 Kan. 50, 292 P.2d 711 (1956); Vern v. Merchants
Mut. Cas. Co., 21 Misc. 2d 51, 118 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Farm Bureau Mut.
Auto Ins. v. Boecher, 48 N.E.2d 895 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
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insurance coverage was not intended to reach such cars because the premiums
were insufficient to justify the risks involved. Concededly, consent of the
owner was lacking in this case. However, since the words "not regularly
furnished" were not designed to require permission, it is difficult to say that
they should imply the affirmative condition that permission was required
for coverage. It is clear that a stolen car is not within the exclusion of cars
furnished for regular use and if permission for occasional use is not implied
from the positive exclusion it would seem that the stolen car is within the
scope of the policy. As the court said, to interpret the word "furnished"
as requiring consent would entail rewriting the phrase "not regularly fur-
nished" so as to read "occasionally furnished, with the permission of the
owner" thereby converting a negative condition into a positive condition,
not furthering the purpose which the limitation of coverage was designed
to serve.4 Moreover, if the insurer intended to make permission a condition
of liability in the case of nonowned automobiles they could easily have made
it an express requirement as they did for vehicles owned by the insured.
The inclusion of a stolen car within the literal terms of the contract of
insurance is clear, but several policy considerations raised by the dissent
cast some doubt whether inclusion is wise. The dissent argued that it was
inconceivable that the parties intended the policy to cover stolen cars.5 This
might have been the subjective intent of the insurer but he failed to express
this intent objectively by excluding stolen cars in the words of the contract.
Since the insurer prepares the insurance policy and the insured is forced to
accept it as written it is generally held that any ambiguity must be con-
strued against the insurer.6 In a case where a literal reading includes cover-
age, a universally accepted rule of construction might well be the determining
factor.
The dissent also stressed the argument that holding the insurance
company liable would in effect make the insured the beneficiary of her own
crime in that she was driving a stolen car at the time of the accident.7
Arguably, the same defense could be applied whenever an insured violated
the law while operating a motor vehicle.8 Furthermore, the insurer is not
asked to indemnify the insured for the criminal consequences of her stealing
the car, but rather for the results of her negligence in the operation of the
car.9 The point is difficult however for the accident did occur when the
4 Sperling v. Great Am. Indem. Co., supra note 1, at 446, 447, 199 N.Y.S.2d at
469, 166 N.E.2d at 485.
G Id. at 453, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 474, 166 N.E.2d at 488.
6 Bachman v. Independence Indem. Co., 214 Cal. 529, 6 P.2d 943 (1931); Greaves
v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 120, 181 N.Y.S.2d 489, 155 N.E.2d 390 (1959);
Bobier v. National Cas. Co., 143 Ohio St. 215, 54 N.E.2d 798 (1944).
7 Sperling v. Great Am. Indem. Co., supra note 1, at 453, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 474,
166 NXE.2d at 488.
8 See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Haley, 129 Miss. 525, 92 So. 635 (1922); Sky
v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613, 29 A.2d 230 (1942).
9 See Messersmith v. American Fid. Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921);
Annot., 19 A.L.R. 876 (1922).
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daughter was attempting to elude the police who were in pursuit of the
stolen car. But the principle remains that a person should not profit from
his own wrong, and it is difficult to see how the daughter made a profit by
committing the crime.
On balance the court seems to give great weight to the social policy of
equalization of risk and compensation for innocent victims. This position
of the court appears to be justified from a policy standpoint because the
New York Legislature has expressed a definite desire to protect the traveller
on the highways from the hazards of motor travel apart from merely holding
the tortfeasor responsible in damages. Since 1929 New York has had a
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,10 requiring proof of financial
security after the first accident. In 1957 New York passed the Motor
Vehicle Financial Security Act" which requires proof of financial security
prior to registration of the automobile. It is the declared purpose of the new
act that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents be compensated for
physical injury and monetary loss inflicted upon them.'2 Policies of insur-
ance written under these laws should be interpreted liberally to further the
purpose expressed by the legislature.' 3
Initially, this decision seems difficult to justify, but viewed in the
light of other decisions dealing with related areas of automobile insurance
law, it becomes easier to accept. An Illinois Court reached the same result
in a recent case when faced with an analogous fact situation.14 The policy,
as in the Sperling case, covered nonowned automobiles not regularly fur-
nished for the use of the insured. The accident occurred when the insured
employee was driving his employer's car without authority and after work-
ing hours. The Court reasoned that the car was not furnished for the
regular use of the insured employee at the time of the accident and that there
was nothing in the policy which excluded coverage in the event the car
10 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 330-368. On this general subject see Collins,
"Implementation of Public Policy Against Financially Irresponsible Motorists," 19
Brooklyn L. Rev. 11 (1952); Legislation, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 170 (1957); Note, 8
Syracuse L. Rev. 223 (1957).
11 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 310-321.
12 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 310 reads in part as follows: "Declaration of
purpose. The legislature is concerned over the rising toll of motor vehicle accidents and
the suffering and loss thereby inflicted. The legislature determines that it is a matter
of grave concern that motorists shall be financially able to respond in damages for
their negligent acts, so that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents may be
recompensed for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon them. .... "
13 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4295 at 62, 63 (1942). "The bene-
ficiaries of such an act and of such a policy when issued, are the members of the general
public who may be injured in automobile accidents by such person; and the policies
are generally construed with great liberality to accomplish their purpose." On purpose
of compulsory insurance statute see N.Y. Edison Co. v. City of N.Y., 268 N.Y. 669,
198 N.E. 550 (1936). On purpose of similar statute in Massachusetts see Opinion of
the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925).
14 Schoenknecht v. Prairie State Farmers Ins. Ass'n, 27 Ill. App. 2d 83, 169
N.E.2d 148 (1960).
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involved was being operated by the insured without the owner's knowledge.
This case is not quite as far-reaching as Sperling in that the taking was
authorized in the first place, but the principles applied to both cases are
the same.
A New York case 5 and an Ohio case 6 dealing with the related question
of permission both held that the requirement was satisfied even though at
the time of the accident the person who had obtained permission to drive
the car of the insured had relinquished the wheel to a companion against the
instructions of the insured. These cases are further illustrations of the
liberality of the courts in interpreting automobile insurance policies.
In this age of high-powered automobiles and crowded highways every-
one should have the assurance that if he is involved in an accident he will
be compensated at least to some degree for his loss. The great danger
involved due to the increased number of cars on the road would seem to
require adequate liability insurance coverage for all drivers. By the same
token, insurance companies should offer policies which provide for a reason-
able amount of coverage. The innocent victim's wife in the Sperling case
should be compensated by someone and perhaps it is better to spread the
risk among society as a whole rather than placing the burden entirely on
the person responsible for the accident.' 7 While a consideration of these
policies of the law should not extend coverage beyond the limits of the
contract, they should be considered in construing any ambiguity with respect
to coverage.
15 Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158, 156 N.E. 650 (1927). See Annot., 54 A.L.R.
845 (1928).
16 Brown v. Kennedy, 141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E.2d 857 (1943).
17 For criticism of this view see Cooperrider, Book Review, 56 Mich. L. Rev.
1291 (1958).
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